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Neural Reuse in the Evolution
and Development of the Brain:
Evidence for Developmental
Homology?
ABSTRACT: This article lays out some of the empirical evidence for the impor-
tance of neural reuse—the reuse of existing (inherited and/or early developing)
neural circuitry for multiple behavioral purposes—in defining the overall
functional structure of the brain. We then discuss in some detail one particular
instance of such reuse: the involvement of a local neural circuit in finger aware-
ness, number representation, and other diverse functions. Finally, we consider
whether and how the notion of a developmental homology can help us understand
the relationships between the cognitive functions that develop out of shared neu-
ral supports.  2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Dev Psychobiol 55: 42–51, 2013.
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INTRODUCTION
How are neural resources deployed to support cognitive
functioning in the adult organism, and how does that
architecture come about? That is, what evolutionary
and developmental pathways does the brain follow in
acquiring its repertoire of capacities? Consider two pos-
sible options, one that has been largely identified with
the embodied/embedded school of cognitive science,
and another associated with evolutionary psychology.
A long-standing guiding principle of both embodied
cognitive science (ECS) and evolutionary psychology
(EvoPsy) is that cognition was built within a system
primarily fitted to situated action. The central nervous
system—the neocortex most definitely included—is
first and foremost a control system for an organism
whose main job is managing the myriad challenges
posed by its environment. ‘‘Higher’’ cognitive faculties
like language and abstract reasoning had to find their
neural niche (Dehaene, 2011) within the constraints im-
posed (and the opportunities offered) by the way exist-
ing neural resources were deployed for this purpose, in
a way mediated and guided by whatever continuing se-
lection pressure there is to maintain fast, effective and
efficient solutions to pressing environmental challenges.
Insofar as this is true, then—and this is the other guid-
ing principle shared between EvoPsy and ECS—this
phylogenetic history should have left detectable traces
on both brain and behavior. Where EvoPsy and ECS
part company is in their understanding of what those
traces will look like, and where to find them.
In particular, EvoPsy has adopted a methodological
focus on the challenges posed by the environment of
selection (Buss, 2005), which has in turn led many
researchers in this area to spotlight the efficiency of
individual algorithmic and heuristic solutions to those
problems. One result of this focus had been the devel-
opment of the ‘‘adaptive toolbox’’ model of mind
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). Given the presumed pres-
sures on these tools of mind for immediate and efficient
operation, independent, modular neural implementa-
tions of these tools seem a sensible solution.
In contrast, ECS is especially interested in under-
standing the ways in which thinking is both influenced
and partially constituted by emotional and physical
states, bodily activity, and interactions between self,
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others and environment (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh,
2010; Chandler & Schwarz, 2009; Chemero, 2009;
Kelso, 1995; Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Varela, Thompson,
& Rosch, 1990). When considering the neural supports
for cognition, this perspective naturally places greater
weight on the functional relations and interactions be-
tween neural structures than on the actions of individual
regions. Moreover, this perspective has led ECS to
focus less on the efficiency of individual solutions, and
more on overall efficiency in the use of bodily (and
environmental and social) resources for cognitive ends.
For ECS, resource constraints and efficiency consider-
ations dictate that whenever possible neural, behavioral,
and environmental resources should have been reused
and redeployed in support of any newly emerging cog-
nitive capacities. Functionally isolated and dedicated
neural modules just do not seem to make good design
sense given the importance of efficient use of available
resources, and of ongoing interactions to shaping func-
tion. For ECS, cognition is largely supported by ‘‘old
wheels, springs and pulleys only slightly altered’’ and
reconfigured to serve present purposes.
A logical place to look for evidence of such a histo-
ry is in the distribution of and relationships between
the neural circuits supporting various cognitive func-
tions. ECS predicts that neural circuits originally
evolved or developed for one purpose will be reused in
later emerging functionality. That is, rather than follow-
ing an evolutionary/developmental pathway wherein we
develop specialized, dedicated neural hardware to meet
each new environmental/behavioral challenge, ECS
suggests that much local neural structure is conserved
but is often combined and recombined by different
organisms in different ways to achieve diverse
purposes.
Imagine a simple brain consisting of six local neural
circuits that could be combined in various ways to
support two cognitive-behavioral tasks. Figure 1 illus-
trates three logical possibilities for how the local neural
circuits could be functionally arranged to support
the tasks in question. In a modular brain, shown in
Figure 1a, local circuits 1, 2, and 3 would combine to
support one task (represented using broken gray lines),
and 2, 4, 5, 6 would work together to support the other
(represented with black lines). Although there might be
some neural and functional overlap between the mod-
ules (local circuit 2 active in supporting both tasks),
the neural underpinnings of different behaviors and
abilities would be largely segregated. In contrast, if
the brain is more holistically organized, all the local
circuits might be engaged in supporting both tasks,
with the behavioral differences possibly reflected in
such things as different oscillatory dynamics. Finally,
it could be the case that many of the local circuits are
used to support both tasks, but for each task, they coop-
erate in different patterns, with different partners. So
for instance, in Figure 1c, local circuit 1 cooperates
with local circuits 2 and 3 in the black task and with
local circuits 5 and 6 in the gray task.
If such reuse (an especially pure case of which is
illustrated in Fig. 1c) obtains in the brain, then we
should expect at least three things to be true of its func-
tional structure. First, local neural circuits should be
used and reused for diverse purposes in various task
domains. That is, in contrast to what is illustrated by
Figure 1a, local circuits should not be classically selec-
tive in the sense of responding only to a highly restrict-
ed class of stimuli or tasks. Second, we should expect
the functional differences between task domains to be
reflected less in differences in what neural real estate is
implicated in supporting the domains than in the differ-
ent patterns of interaction between many of the same
elements (in contrast to the brain illustrated in Fig. 1b).
And third, we should expect later emerging (evolving
FIGURE 1 Three logical possibilities for the functional structure of the brain.
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or developing) behaviors/abilities to be supported by a
greater number of local circuits, more broadly scattered
in the brain. The reason is simple: the later something
emerges, the more potentially useful existing circuitry
there will be, and little reason to suppose it will be
grouped locally. There is in fact evidence for all three
of these predictions, some of which will be recounted,
below.
Taking up the first prediction, one recent study
(Anderson & Pessoa, 2011) examined the functional di-
versity of 78 standard anatomical regions of the brain
(based on the Freesurfer atlas) by determining whether
(and how often) each was active in 1,138 experimental
tasks in 11 different BrainMap task domains: action ex-
ecution; action observation; action inhibition; attention;
audition; vision; emotion; language semantics; reason-
ing; explicit (semantic) memory; and working memory
(Fox et al., 2005). Using a diversity scale ranging from
0 (active in only a single cognitive domain) to 1 (equal-
ly active across all 11 cognitive domains), it was deter-
mined that the overall average diversity of the 78 large
anatomical regions was .70 (SD .12). The overall aver-
age diversity of cortical regions was .71 (SD .11) and
of subcortical regions was .63 (SD .17). Put differently,
the regions were active in an average of 95 tasks
spread across 9 cognitive domains. These results are
represented graphically in Figure 2 using a cool-to-hot
scale (gray indicates no information).
The analysis was also performed in a brain divided
into 1,054 neural regions. The overall average diversity
of the 574 small cortical and 21 small subcortical
regions activated by 5 or more experiments was .52
(SD .13). Those 595 regions were activated by an aver-
age of more than 10 experiments across 5 cognitive
domains. The overall average diversity of the cortical
regions was .52 (SD .13) and of the subcortical regions
was .59 (SD .12). The upshot: local neural circuits are
not highly selective, and typically contribute to multi-
ple tasks across domain boundaries.
To examine the second prediction, we performed a
functional coactivation analysis of 1,127 experimental
tasks from the dataset (Anderson, Brumbaugh, &
Suben, 2010), falling into 10 of the BrainMap task
domains (Fox et al., 2005; for this study we excluded
action inhibition, as it contained too few experiments
for this approach). In a functional connectivity analysis,
one looks to see how often regions of the brain co-
activate under various tasks conditions. If the regions
co-activate more often than would be expected given
the activation likelihood of the individual regions—that
is, if the probability of region A and region B being
active in the same task is significantly (p < .01) higher
than would be predicted from the general probability of
A being active and the general probability of B being
active—then this indicates there is a ‘‘functional con-
nection’’ between the regions.
FIGURE 2 Task diversity of brain regions. Image prepared by Josh Kinnison and Srikanth
Padmala, University of Maryland.
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The results of such a study can be represented as a
graph. A graph is simply a set of ‘‘nodes’’ joined by
‘‘edges,’’ where the nodes and edges can represent vari-
ous aspects of a modeled system. For instance, in an
airline route map nodes are airports and edges represent
flights between them, and in a Facebook-style social
network nodes are people and edges indicate ‘‘friend-
ship.’’ In a brain functional network like that depicted
in Figure 3, the nodes represent individual brain
regions, plotted in a 3D anatomical space, and
the edges represent functional connections between
them—that is, a higher-than-expected likelihood of co-
activation during tasks in a given cognitive domain.
Looking at the data in this format, it is easy to compare
how often a given region is active in more than one
domain, and how often it has the same neural partners
in more than one domain.
Figure 3 highlights the functional partners of left
precentral gyrus (the functional roles of which will
be discussed further below) during semantics tasks,
FIGURE 3 The functional partners of left precentral gyrus under three different task conditions.
(a) Semantics, (b) emotion, (c) attention. Graphs rendered with Gephi http://www.gephi.org
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emotion tasks, and attention tasks. Visually, it is clear
that while this neural region is active in supporting
tasks in different domains, it rarely shares the same
functional partners across domains.
We can make this individual visual result quantita-
tive and general by comparing the average node over-
lap with the average edge overlap in a pair-wise
comparison of all the functional networks from the
10 cognitive domains analyzed. Referring back to
Figure 1, we can easily generate predictions for the
three possible functional architectures. If the brain is
largely modular, then we should expect both low node
overlap and low edge overlap. If, however, the brain is
holistically organized, we should expect high node and
high edge overlap. Finally, if the brain developed by
reusing individual neural circuits for diverse purposes,
then we should see high node overlap, but low edge
overlap.
Using Dice’s coefficient as our measure, D ¼
2(o1,2)/(n1 þ n2), where o1,2 represents the number of
shared components (edges or nodes) in the two net-
works, and nx represents the total number of compo-
nents in each network, we discover that the mean
overlap for the nodes (DN) ¼ .60 (SD .13) while the
mean overlap of the edges (DE) ¼ .09 (SD .07). Of
course, one might worry that this result is simply an
artifact of the fact that in networks there are many
more possible edges than nodes, so one would expect
to get this result just by chance. Thus it is important to
compare these averages with the expected overlaps be-
tween random networks with the same number of edges
and nodes as our brain networks. Doing a pair-wise
comparison of random networks, Mean (DrN) ¼ .50
(SD .11) and mean (DrE) ¼ .14 (SD .07). All differen-
ces are significant p  .01 (Fig. 4). That is, the results
indicate that between functional brain networks there is
significantly more node overlap and significantly less
edge overlap than would be expected by chance. These
results replicate, with a much larger data set, those
reported in Anderson (2008), and strongly suggest that
low edge overlap and high node overlap between task
domains is a functionally significant feature of these
brain networks.
Finally, turning to the third prediction that recently
emerged cognitive functions should be supported by
more and more broadly scattered circuitry than tasks in
older domains, Anderson (2008, 2007, 2010) reports
that later developing functions like language are sup-
ported by more local circuits, more broadly distributed
in the brain, than are early developing domains like
visual perception and attention.
Taken together, this evidence seems to favor a reuse
model of functional organization over both modularity
and holism. And given the current context it is worth
noting that these data do not distinguish between an
evolutionary account, and a developmental one. That is,
the evidence paints a picture of the functional structure
of the adult brain as emerging from a process of neural
reuse, but it does not (cannot) differentiate the relative
contributions of evolutionary and developmental pres-
sures. It does not seem right to argue over this distinc-
tion in the absence of data (if we should argue about it
at all—as Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) point out,
these influences are difficult if not impossible to disen-
tangle). Rather, we should think about the opportunities
for analysis the reuse perspective offers, whatever the
timescale of its causes.
For instance, if this process takes place over evolu-
tionary time, we should expect to see cross-species
homologues, as structure inherited from a shared ances-
tor is put to different cognitive uses in different organ-
isms (Katz, 2010). Additionally, as Moore and Moore
(2010) suggest, ‘‘[b]ecause two or more psychological
characteristics present at a given point in development
might both (re)use neural circuits formed much earlier
in development, thinking about such characteristics in
terms of developmental homology could well illumi-
nate their relationship to each other (as well as to other
psychological characteristics present earlier in develop-
ment that also depend on these circuits).’’
The developmental homology perspective appears
to represent a promising strategy. Here, we provide one
example of how taking such a perspective can illumi-
nate the relationship between cognitive domains and, in
turn, the phenomena of interest. Finger gnosis (finger
representation) and number representation are develop-
mentally correlated (Fayol, Barrouillet, & Marinthe,
1998; Noe¨l, 2005; Penner-Wilger et al., 2007, 2008,
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FIGURE 4 The average amount of overlap of nodes and
edges in functional brain graphs as compared to random
graphs.
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2009). This relation between finger and number repre-
sentation arises, at least in part, because the two tasks
use overlapping neural circuits—one of the neural cir-
cuits integrated into the functional complex supporting
finger gnosis is also part of the functional complex sup-
porting the representation of number. There is strong
evidence that some of the brain regions associated with
finger gnosis (in the left precentral gyrus and left angu-
lar gyrus) are activated during tasks requiring the repre-
sentation of number (Dehaene et al., 1996; de Jong,
van Zomeren, Willemsen, & Paans, 1996; Go¨bel,
Johansen-Berg, Behrens, & Rushwort, 2004; Jancke,
Loose, Lutz, Specht, & Shah, 2000; Kuhtz-Buschbeck
et al., 2003; Liu, Wang, Corbly, Zhang, & Joseph,
2006; Numminen et al., 2004; Pesenti, Thioux, Seron,
& De Volder, 2000; Pinel, Piazza, LeBihan, &
Dehaene, 2004; Venkatraman, Ansari, & Chee, 2005).
Moreover, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(rTMS; Rusconi, Walsh, & Butterworth, 2005) and di-
rect cortical stimulation (Roux, Boetto, Sacko, Chollet,
& Tremoulet, 2003) have been found to disrupt both
finger gnosis and tasks requiring the representation
of number. These findings are consistent with neural
reuse; one of the neural circuits originally evolved or
developed for finger representation has been reused
in the (presumably) later-emerging function of number
representation, and now serves both uses.
One tenet of reuse, for which there is strong empiri-
cal support, is that a typical brain area contributes to
many uses across domains (Anderson, 2010). Thus,
having identified a shared circuit involved in both fin-
ger and number representation [here we will focus on
the shared circuit within the left precentral gyrus (42,
0, 38)  6 mm], we next looked across domains to
identify other uses that the circuit was supporting (see
Penner-Wilger & Anderson, 2011 for a more complete
account). This step was taken to both guide and con-
strain the function–structure mapping—to help discover
what the circuit is doing in all the uses it supports. We
analyzed a dataset of 2,603 functional imaging studies
in over 60 task domains, reported in 823 journal
articles published between 1996 and 2010. The data
were compiled from the NICAM and BrainMap data-
bases (Anderson et al., 2010; Laird, Lancaster, & Fox,
2005), with each experiment in the data set classified
by cognitive domain according to the BrainMap taxon-
omy (Fox & Lancaster, 2002; Fox et al., 2005). All
the studies involved healthy adults and used a within-
subjects, whole-brain univariate design. That is, for
all the studies in the data set, brain activity during an
experimental task was observed over the whole brain
(not just a region of interest) and then compared voxel-
wise to activity observed in the same participant during
a control task.
Using this data collection, we searched for experi-
ments reporting activation inside the region of interest
(ROI) in the left precentral gyrus. The results of the
database search provided 65 articles reporting 80 tasks
showing activation within the ROI. Of the tasks, 60
were in the domain of cognition (sub-domains: atten-
tion, language, mathematics, memory, time and theory
of mind), 11 were in the domain of action (sub-
domains: execution, inhibition, imagination and
preparation), 7 were in the domain of perception (sub-
domains: audition, somesthesis, and vision), and 2 were
in the domain of emotion. Thus, consistent with reuse,
the ROI was involved in varied uses across domains.
Recall that the purpose for using this cross-domain
modeling methodology was to inform the function-
structure mapping—what the shared circuit is doing
during all these various tasks. In looking across the spe-
cific experimental tasks and subtractions identified by
the database search, three themes emerged in addition
to number representation and finger representation:
generation (e.g., generate items in a given category),
inhibition (e.g., incongruent Stroop condition, anti-
saccade, response inhibition), and order tasks (e.g.,
performing memorized sequences of saccades, judging
alphabetical or sequential order, n-back task—in which
participants are presented with a continuous sequence
of stimuli and indicate whenever the current stimulus
matches the one from n steps back in the sequence).
For reuse to have occurred, the service offered by the
shared circuit must be something that the different uses
could benefit from incorporating.
Applying this perspective to the uses found in
the database search, we identified some common
requirements across uses, including ordered storage of
discrete representations and mapping between represen-
tational forms. Although neural activations are general-
ly assigned functional processes specific to the
domain under investigation (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000),
cross-domain structure–function mapping requires a do-
main-independent vocabulary. Thus, using vocabulary
drawn from computation, our proposal for the struc-
ture–function pairing that could meet the functional
requirements imposed by the multiple uses is an array
of pointers. An array is an ordered group, and a pointer
is a data structure that designates a memory location
and can indicate different data types.
A concrete, familiar example of an array is an
Advent calendar. Within a typical Advent calendar (the
storage structure) chocolates are stored in an ordered
form by date. An array can be used to store different
types, not just chocolates. For example, some Advent
calendars allow parents to place their own items in the
storage structure (perhaps small toys or other treats).
One of the authors’ friends has such an Advent
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calendar and instead of storing the treats within the cal-
endar structure she instead writes notes for her children
(budding readers) pointing them to a designated loca-
tion where the treat is hidden (stored) in their house.
This Advent calendar illustrates an array of pointers,
where what is stored in the array (calendar) is the loca-
tion of the data (chocolate), not the data itself.
An array of pointers meets the functional require-
ments imposed by the multiple uses of the ROI. It
allows for storage and access of ordered elements,
which are able to point to—or index—representations
in memory, allowing for mapping between different
representational forms. An array of pointers could be
used for ordered storage of distinct representations
of each finger, ordered by location, and for discrete rep-
resentations of numbers, ordered by magnitude, across
different representational forms (e.g., non-symbolic
representations as well as numerals and number
words). The proposal of a pointer structure is not un-
precedented or neurologically implausible; indeed such
a structure is consistent with the semantic pointer archi-
tecture, a recent elaboration of the Neural Engineering
Framework (Eliasmith, in press; Eliasmith & Anderson,
2003). Thus, cross-domain modeling, compelled by evi-
dence for reuse, can productively guide function–struc-
ture mapping.
So, given the evidence for neural reuse presented
above, what is the benefit of taking a developmental
homology perspective? One tenet of this perspective is
that neural reuse should leave a detectable trace on
behavior. That is, given that the tasks share a common
physical-functional substrate that has been recombined
with additional neural circuits to support performance
of multiple tasks, we should expect to be able to find
similar behavioral phenomena across tasks. This proves
to be the case in both finger and number representation.
One landmark phenomenon in number representation is
the distance effect—it is harder to differentiate numbers
that are closer together in magnitude than those that
are farther apart (e.g., 3 vs. 4 is harder than 1 vs. 9;
Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998). The
same phenomenon is also found in finger gnosis—it is
harder to differentiate fingers that are closer together
physically than those that are farther apart (Benton,
Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983; Gregor, House,
Zigler, & Penner-Wilger, 2012). Given that this effect
in finger gnosis is likely a result of the underlying
physical/spatial distribution of the nerves in the hand
and the way the information is represented in the brain
(and is therefore likely to obtain in many sensory sys-
tems) the fact that it is also observed in an apparently
abstract functional domain like magnitude comparison
is all the more striking. In light of the independent
evidence for the circuit sharing between part of the
finger-sense system and part of the number processing
system, the persistence of a distance effect across these
domains appears to reflect the influence of stable func-
tional characteristics of the shared circuit, and thus to
represent the kind of inheritance of ‘‘special qualities’’
that often signals a homology.
In addition, taking such a developmental perspective
potentially sheds light on order effects in learning,
and on the nature and importance of critical periods—
especially when (re-)understood in light of the concept
of ‘‘burden’’ (Riedl, 1978; Wagner, 1999): the more
multiply integrated a circuit becomes, the more difficult
to change its local character without affecting many
different functions. Reuse, then, should place specific,
detectible constraints on development that can be inves-
tigated observationally in humans, and experimentally
in animals. Insofar as learning new tasks refines
local circuitry and establishes additional long distance
connections, these changes will be more compatible
with some future learning pathways than with others.
Learning task A followed by B might make learning
task X difficult and Y easy, while learning task A fol-
lowed by C might have the opposite effect, as a result
of the different demands B and C place on the relevant
neural circuitry. Certainly we see examples of the en-
hancement of later-acquired capacities as the result of
apparently unrelated skills acquired earlier. For exam-
ple, children who receive pitch training starting in first
grade perform better in mathematics longitudinally in
third grade (Gardiner, 2008). In light of such findings,
however, it seems reasonable to also predict instances
where the burden on a circuit negatively impacts learn-
ability and performance. We know, for instance, that
visual experience restricts the plasticity of visual cir-
cuits as compared with the congenitally blind (Bedny,
Pascual-Leone, Dravida, & Saxe, 2011), and we would
expect to see similar effects for shared circuitry.
Overall, it appears that identifying both cross-
species and developmental homologies potentially
offers both conceptual and experimental leverage for
advancing our understanding of the brain. This being
said, it also appears that some more conceptual work is
called for to specify the differences between identifying
a developmental homology, and simply uncovering
instances of developmental continuity. Although the
neural overlap between the finger gnosis and number
representation circuits can be said to represent an in-
stance of homology—including a shared precursor and
the inheritance of ‘‘special qualities’’ (in the distance
effect)—there are nevertheless some suggestive disanal-
ogies here. First, there need not be a copy of the neural
structure that is adapted to new uses; instead the very
same structure comes to participate in different func-
tional complexes. Thus, neither the physical structure
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nor the developmental pathway is duplicated, and while
the function is in some sense duplicated, it is a
temporal rather than a physical or spatial duplication.
Similarly, one of the oft-cited criteria for homologous
structures is that they occupy the same position with
the same connections in two different species. But in
the case of neural reuse, the different uses of a given
circuit are differentiated precisely by their different
(functional) connections to other neural structures.
On the other hand, perhaps these factors need not
disqualify an instance of reuse from counting as an in-
stance of homology. Consider the case of serial homol-
ogy, which does not always involve developmental
duplication. Although many serial homologues begin
as developmental duplications, there are cases of
serial homologues (such as leaf hopper helmets, which
are wing homologues) that have been released from se-
lection pressures, so that their appearance is now large-
ly determined by separate genetic factors, not resulting
from gene duplication (Prud’homme et al., 2011).
Thus, they do not share any common developmental
resources in a particular instance of development.
Moreover, in a serial homology the physical struc-
ture need not occupy the same position with the same
connections in different species; indeed, in some cases
it cannot, in virtue of the inherit-and-duplicate aspect
of serial homologues. In fact, it is precisely their viola-
tion of this rule that makes serial homologies so inter-
esting, and such a force of evolutionary change.
So perhaps indeed a case could be made that instan-
ces of neural reuse might be fruitfully understood as a
kind of developmental serial homology—the augmenta-
tion of overall function via temporal duplication of
function. Yet there is certainly much more reflection
required before such a possibility could be established.
And as delving deeper into these issues would take us
into a long and complicated discussion about the under-
lying nature of and criteria for serial homology, it is
perhaps better to close instead with the thought that,
however the conversation develops, it is nevertheless
clear that the concept of developmental homology
has the potential to focus attention on some crucial
questions and phenomena, and thereby help advance
our understanding of the evolutionary and developmen-
tal origins of cognition.
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